23 февраля 1944 года войска НКВД по приказу Сталина совершили чудовищные преступления в Ингушетии в ходе депортации ингушского народа. В нескольких селах были заживо сожжены сотни людей, в том числе дети и женщины. Об этом рассказывается в фильме грузинского историка Мариана Хуцишвили о горной Ингушетии, снятого в 1988 году (отрывок ВИДЕО). На кадрах — развалины школы интерната для местных детей, построенной в 30-х годах 20-го века рядом с башнями Хамхи. Съемочная группа фильма не предполагала, что в этих развалинах когда-то произошло одно из самых чудовищных преступлении Сталина и НКВД-массовое сожжение живых людей. Чахкиев Джабраил, профессор истории: «В Хамхи сожгли, в ЦIеча-Ахке сожгли. Я писал об этом в 90-е. Замок Евлоевых взорвали, много людей погибло. Евлоевых собрали, Цороевых

Se împlinesc 22 de ani, zilele acestea, de la violentele evenimente din ianuarie-februarie 1999 – cunoscute sub denumirea de ”Mineriada a V-a” –, evenimente care au înspăimântat Europa și au deturnat România de la parcursul firesc, democratic, întârziind cu ani buni aderarea la NATO și integrarea europeană, fapt ce a comportat consecințe dezastruoase pentru țara noastră, urmări pe care încă le resimțim. Podul.ro vă prezintă o parte dintre concluziile rechizitoriului ”Mineriadei a V-a” – vă amintim că dosarul a fost instrumentat, la vremea respectivă, de procurorii militari coordonați de colonelul Viorel Siserman, prim procuror al Parchetului Militar Cluj, care a desfășurat (2006-2007) cercetări vizând o serie de episoade aferente dosarului ”Mineriada”. Inițial, ancheta fusese îngropată cu rapiditate, în perioada 2000-2004, când la Cotroceni a revenit fostul nomenklaturist Ion Iliescu, iar la Palatul Victoria s-


Russia sees psychological warfare as part of a comprehensive informational confrontation with the enemy (mainly Western countries). All three Russian special services – the FSB, SVR and GRU – are involved in covert influence operations, each with a different focus. According to the Russian Armed Forces’ doctrine, psychological warfare is one of the three main components of ‘informational confrontation’ – the other two being information-technical influencing of foreign countries (e.g. through cyberattacks) and protecting Russia against foreign information operations. For Russia, psychological warfare is the information-psychological influencing of foreign audiences to change their views and behaviour in Russia’s national interest, including achieving the Russian Armed Forces’ objectives. Russia sees psychological warfare as part of a comprehensive informational confrontation with the enemy (mainly Western countries), and it is ongoing both during conflict and in peacetime. According to Russian doctrine, the targets of psychological warfare include the political leadership, military personnel and their families, the civilian population, and certain specific target groups, such as ethnic and religious minorities, opposition groups and businesspeople – in friendly, neutral and hostile foreign countries alike. This means that the entire world population outside Russia is a potential target. Within the Russian Armed Forces, psychological operations are the responsibility of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU); the GRU develops the plan for psychological warfare, which is then approved by the Chief of the General Staff. The GRU’s chief psychological operations division is military unit 54777. Both unit 54777 and the regional GRU psy-ops units subordinated to it study, analyse and assess the military-political situation in foreign countries, and the morale and psychology of their military and civilian population. They prepare psychological influence materials and participate in the armed forces’ deception activities, or maskirovka, and counter-propaganda. Working undercover, they establish international contacts while concealing their connection with the GRU. They also study Russian and foreign experience in carrying out psychological operations. Psy-ops units monitor foreign media on a daily basis to keep abreast of the coverage of issues relevant to the GRU, current events and Russia’s role in them. Regular media monitoring reports identify, among other things, influential Western publications’ articles that are in line with Russian interests; these are boosted through fake social media accounts and GRU-controlled online portals. The choice of topics depends on the GRU’s priorities, which may change in time. In online propaganda, GRU focuses on popular social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Reddit and VK (VKontakte). The work is measured quantitatively: in addition to the number of items produced in each category (e.g. opinion pieces, news stories and comments), the spread of these materials (e.g. the number of likes or shares) is also monitored. In 2020, GRU-controlled English-language online portals (such as inforos.ru, infobrics.org and oneworld.press) disseminated false information about the COVID-19 pandemic, undermining the Western countries’ efforts to curb the spread of the virus and praising Russia’s actions. For example, they spread the statement that the US is taking advantage of the pandemic to assert its worldview and the coronavirus is in fact an American bioweapon. The GRU uses these portals to plant disinformation in the public sphere of foreign countries,


in the hope that it will spread and the original source will go unnoticed. One of the avenues pursued by the GRU psy-ops units is to influence Russians living abroad. To carry out this task, the psy-ops units have set up organisations and media outlets to gather and provide Russians residing abroad solely with information that aligns with Russia’s interests (and is therefore often biased).


In October 2014, about six months after the occupation of Crimea, a conference entitled "The Security of Europe: A New Geopolitical Dimension" was held in Athens without much international attention. At the event, organised by the Institute of Geopolitical Studies, a local think tank, Greek and Russian presenters criticised the EU’s sanctions against Russia and expressed outrage that the Greek government, under pressure from the US and the EU, had behaved so badly towards its ‘traditional friend’. What has so far remained hidden from the public is the fact that the conference was organised by military unit 54777, the GRU’s chief psy-ops division. Alexander Shchedrin, then commander of the unit, publicly described the preparations for the event in the Russian state media outlet Parlamentskaya Gazeta in November 2014, using the title of Deputy Director of the Institute of the Russian Diaspora (Institut Russkogo Zarubezhya), a GRU front: ‘What is happening at this conference right now is breaking through the information blockade that has surrounded our country [since the occupation of Crimea]. We have no outlet to foreign information space. No one else in the world knows anything about the most significant conferences held in Russia. The task was to make sure that Europeans knew what was really threatening them. Member of the State Duma Franz Adamovich Klintsevich came to our organisation, and considering our experience, put forward an idea and a scheme that could be realised; he provided the necessary contacts. We identified a weak link in the West – Greece – which itself suffers from sanctions. We found an organisation [in Greece] that is friendly to Russia, and together we organised this conference.’ At the Athens event, politician Panos Kammenos, co-founder of the Institute of Geopolitical Studies, which co-organised the event with the GRU front, was seated just a few metres from Klintsevich in the front row. The Independent Greeks political party, led by Kammenos, made it to the Greek government three months later, and Kammenos served as defence minister until 2019. Just before the 2015 parliamentary election, Kammenos visited Moscow, where he participated in a round table on the Greek election, organised by the news agency InfoRos, another front for unit 54777. Alongside Kammenos, InfoRos director Denis Tyurin, an officer of unit 54777, gave comments to the media. This case shows how easy it was for the GRU to present its messages to receptive Western audiences and establish high-level contacts. It is noteworthy that the intelligence officers used the cover of an independent journalist or NGO representative.


Russia continues to be the primary security threat to Western democracies also in cyberspace. In addition to espionage, Russian special services are actively using cyberspace in their influence operations to create divisions in Western societies, transnational relations and NATO. The types of cyber attack described in our previous annual reports are still used by the Russian services to carry out their intelligence tasks, which threaten the security of Estonia and our allies. For example, malicious emails infected with malware are sent to targets; these are designed to lure the target, taking into account their field of work and interests (known as spear phishing). Cyber attacks abusing vulnerable websites also continue; in order to infect the target’s device, spyware is added to sites frequently visited by the target (known as watering hole attacks). However, the abuse of cyberspace for influence operations has increased. Russian services have adapted “active measures” from the Soviet period to new circumstances, taking into account the development of the internet and other technology. For example, hacking an information system to steal and leak sensitive information (known as hack-and-leak operations) is similar to an “active measure” familiar from the KGB’s arsenal: the KGB used to disseminate genuine or doctored documents to spark anti-government discussions among the public. The adaptation of such “active measures” is an ongoing process. In the future, the Russian services are likely to exploit deepfake technology, among other things. This threat will be particularly high once technological development reaches a level where deepfakes are convincing enough to be unrecognisable to the human eye. This would make it more difficult for the public to distinguish false information from the truth. As a countermeasure to Russian influence activities, we have put together a selection of Russian services’ methods in cyberspace based on real events (see figure). Cyber operations originating in Russia and the abuse of cyberspace for the purpose of influencing will very likely continue in 2021. These are effective, inexpensive and well-established measures for the Russian services. Moreover, influence operations can be a way to achieve long-term effects without always requiring intervention in the target country’s domestic politics.


To influence another country during a key political event (e.g. an election), the Russian services organise Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against the media and government sector, impeding official information flow among other things. With such cyber attacks, Russia seeks to present itself as a force to be reckoned with, sowing fear and pressuring the target country to make more favourable decisions for Russia. On the day of the Montenegrin parliamentary election in 2016, DoS attacks were launched against the websites of the country’s government and media. The attacks were repeated the following year after Montenegro announced its accession to NATO. In order to disrupt the exchange of accurate information, create fear and deepen internal tensions in society, or damage the credibility of government agencies, Russian services have organised cyber attacks against websites and the information systems of internet service providers. Websites are hacked, planting images, text, video or audio with intimidating, threatening or otherwise disturbing content. Targeting an internet service provider makes it possible to attack a large number of websites simultaneously. In 2019, operatives of the GRU Main Centre for Special Technologies hacked a Georgian internet service provider’s system. Through it, the operatives defaced thousands of websites with an image of former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili accompanied by the text “I’ll be back”.


see more: https://www.valisluureamet.ee/pdf/raport/2021-ENG.pdf

source: Valisluureamet

Из расследования Кавказ-Центра (31 мая 2004 года) 13 февраля 2004 года в столице Катара в городе Доха был убит экс-президент ЧРИ Зелимхан Яндарбиев. Члены русской банда ГРУ, которые готовили теракт под дипломатическим прикрытием, взорвали бомбу несмотря на то, что в машине с Яндарбиевым находился и его 13-летний сын, который получил тяжелые ранения. Закрытый характер, которое носило расследование убийства экс-президента ЧРИ Яндарбиева, первоначально позволял российской стороне искажать действительное положение вещей и фальсифицировать факты. Согласно ранней, краткой информации в СМИ, убийцы экс-президента ЧРИ Яндарбиева прибыв в Доху по фальшивым документам, взяли в аренду мини-вэн, приобрели мобильные телефоны и отправились за взрывчаткой в российское посольство. После этого, в

Ровно 100 лет назад, в конце января 1921 года началось Ишимское, или Западно-Сибирское, антисоветское восстание, крупнейший антикоммунистический бунт гражданской войны. Взбунтоваться людей заставила проводимая советской властью продразверстка: у крестьян принудительно изымали хлеб и другие продукты по установленной норме и государственным ценам. Восстание, наряду с Тамбовским и Кронштадтским, вынудило советское руководство отказаться от политики военного коммунизма и заменить продразверстку продналогом, а в рамках НЭПа разрешить свободную торговлю. Вспыхнув в северо-восточном районе Ишимского уезда Тюменской губернии, восстание в короткий срок охватило большинство волостей Ишимского, Ялуторовского, Тобольского,

"Поначалу, когда я туда попал, я не совсем поверил, что это вообще реально. У меня был своеобразный культурный шок. У Оруэлла описано, как это работает. Думал, что это антиутопия, а на самом деле так и устроено", – рассказывает Сергей К., до недавнего времени сотрудник петербургского агентства ФАН, одного из подразделений "фабрики троллей", которую финансирует "повар Путина" Евгений Пригожин. При поступлении на работу будущих "троллей" вынуждают подписать документ о неразглашении того, что происходит в офисах агентства, однако несколько человек осмелились нарушить эти обязательства. В 2015 году бывший сотрудник "фабрики" Марат Буркхард подробно рассказал Радио Свобода о том, как он работал троллем, публикуя на различных форумах комментарии на заданные темы. Вскоре еще несколько человек дали

В фильме-расследовании Алексея Навального "Дворец для Путина" среди множества российских фамилий упоминается один немец - бывший агент "штази" Маттиас Варниг. Чем он известен? Немец Маттиас Варниг (Matthias Warnig), чье имя упомянул в своем новом фильме "Дворец для Путина"Алексей Навальный, - человек во многом особенный. Это самый давний и самый активный в российском бизнесе немецкий друг президента России Владимира Путина. Навальный упоминает Варнига, когда рассказывает о переписке бывшей супруги нынешнего президента РФ Людмилы с ее немецкой подругой в середине 1990-х. Одно из писем было отправлено с факса Варнига. Российский оппозиционер, ссылаясь в том числе на публикацию DW, рассказывает, что Варниг, бывший агент восточногерманской спецслужбы "штази", ставший в 1990-е годы банкиром,

The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) conducted the experiments, exploring the work of Dr. Salvatore Cezar Pais 'UFO patents' had been vouched for by the head of the Navy's aerospace research enterprise Navy was filing them as Chinese entities worked on similar technology advancements The inventions are enabled through the 'Pais Effect' - a theoretical physics concept based on the 'controlled motion of electrically charged matter' Approximately $466,810 was spent conducting experiments for the project between the Fiscal Years 2017 and 2019. A U.S. Navy file dubbed the 'UFO patents' has revealed how military scientists spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on experiments involving nuclear fusion and electromagnetic fields as part of research into devastating future weapons. The documents claim a 'Spacetime Modification Weapon' could make the Hydrogen bomb

Тридцать лет и три года во главе невидимого фронта. Маркус Вольф, восточногерманский партнер КГБ, – самый сенсационный глава секретной службы, обессмертивший свое имя и вошедший в анналы всемирной история шпионажа. Тридцать три года – беспрецедентный случай! – он руководил Главным управлением разведки ГДР, одерживая одну победу за другой в противоборстве с западными спецслужбами. Пожалуй, именно Маркуса Вольфа имел в виду кардинал от шпионажа Аллен Даллес, однажды произнеся вещие слова: «Когда величие личности и величие совершенных им дел соединяются в одном лице, мы имеем дело с идеалом шпиона». Адрес – Советский Союз Маркус Иоганнес Вольф родился 19 января 1923 года в Германии. Его отец Фридрих Вольф, еврей по крови, писатель-антифашист по убеждению, после

Расследование отравления Навального группой сотрудников НИИ-2 ФСБ поставило вопрос о том, в каких еще операциях участвовала эта бригада убийц. В этой части мы расскажем об известных нам эпизодах, когда команде отравителей удалось убить своих жертв. Как видно из нашего расследования, и жертвы, и мотивы, и способы убийства могли быть не похожими друг на друга — и только команда исполнителей была более или менее постоянной. Причем в команде работают не только сотрудники НИИ-2, но и Служба по защите конституционного строя ФСБ, известная среди прочего преследованием политических активистов. Расследование также показало, что бригада ФСБшников действовала цинично и самоуверенно: скажем, в одном из случаев они перед убийством

Free Joomla! template by L.THEME